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In theory, governments should not resort to financial repression
when they face no constraints on taxation.  In fact, countries
obtain substantial implicit revenue from financial repression.
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Giovannini and de Melo explore the theoretical  *  Reform aimed at liberalizing financial
underpinnings and empirical relevance to public  markets - removing intemational capital
finance of financial repression - of controls on  controls and price and quantity rationing in
intemational capital flows and on domestic  domestic financial intermediation - should first
financial intermediaries.  They conclude:  estimate what amount of govemment revenue
comes from financial repression and provide for
* In principle, countries should not resort to  the revenue shortfall that will result from finan-
financial repression when they face no con-  cial liberalization.
straints on taxation, but such constraints as
administrative cost and income distribution  *  In general, countries with higher rates of
objectives might justify an implicit tax on  inflation, and therefore higher rates of currency
domestic financial markets.  depreciation, tend to raise more revenue from
financial repression - because the relative costs
* The revenue from financial repression,  of foreign and domestic borrowing are influ-
measured as the difference between the foreign  enced by the domestic currency's rate of depre-
and domestic costs of government borrowing,  ciation, since domestic nominal interest rates are
can be substantial. The unweighted cross-  normally fixed administratively.
country average is about 2 percent of GDP and 9
percent of total government revenue (excluding
the revenue from financial repression), but varies
significantly among countries.
The PRE Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Research, and Extemal
Affairs Complex. An objective of the series is to get these fmdings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully  polished.  i
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Stockholm.1  Introduction
Most developing countries  impose controls on international  capital
flows, coupled  with  controls  on domestic  financial  intermediaries.
These  phenomena  have been  extensively  studied  in  development
economics,  and  are  labelled  "financial  repression".  Analyses  of
the effects of financial  repression,  like those  by McKinnon  (1973),
Shaw (1973) and Fry (1988), point to the inefficiencies arising from
controls  on international  asset  trade  and  domestic  financial  inter-
mediaries  and  set  forth  clearcut  policy prescriptions,  which  have
been followed, under  the auspices of international  institutions,  by
a  number  of countries.  These prescriptions  envisage  a removal  of
controls on international  asset  trade,  together  with  the removal  of
price and  quantity  rationing  in domestic financial intermediation.1
While  the  theoretical  analyses  of the  effects of controls  on fi-
nancial  markets  are  clearly  correct,  their  direct  applications  to
policy have neglected  the presence of important  additional  distor-
tions  in  the  economy.  More satisfactory  approaches  to  financial
liberalization  should  explicitly  account  for these  pre-existing  dis-
tortions,  including  the ones  associated  with  government  spending
and taxes.  In particular,  considering the effects of government  rev-
enue constraints  and  the distortions  associated  with  different forms
of taxation  would provide a more complete assessment  of the costs
and  benefits of financial  controls and  financial liberalization.2
In  this  paper  we provide  empirical  evidence  to  highlight  the
interactions  of financial  controls  and  tax  policies.  Indeed,  we re-
gard  government-imposed  controls  on domestic  financial  markets
as a form of taxation,  and we estimate  the amount  of revenue that
developing  countries  have  obtained  from  it.  Our  approach  is  a
natural  extension  of the  ideas of Phelps  (1973) and  his followers,
who pioneered  the  study  of government  policies  and  their  distor-
tions  from  the perspective  of public finance.3 We do not,  in this
'Recent  work  has  stressed  the  importance  of the  appropriate  sequencing  of  liberalization
policies.  See for example  Buffie  (1985),  Corbo  and  de Melo  (1987)  and  Edwards  (1984).
2See, for analysis  of public-finance  aspects  of the  distortions  in financial  markets,  Chamley
and  Hussain  (]988),  Dornbusch  and  Giovannini  (1988),  Dornbusch  and Reynoso  (1989),  East-
erly  (1989),  Giovanrini  (1988),  Tornell (1988).  For  public  finance  analyses  of trade  protection
in  LDCs  see  in  particular  Mitra  (1987)  and Heady  and  Mitra  (1987).
3Fischer  (1982),  for  example,  estimates  the  government  revenue  from  the  inflation  tax.
1paper,  attempt  to  provide  any  normative  statement  on  whether  or
not  liberalization  is a  desirable  strategy  to  follow.4 Our  more  lim-
ited  objective  is to  point  to  the  first-order  impact  of liberalization
policies  on  government  budgets.  The  size  and  nature  of govern-
ment  revenue  from  financial  repression  will  indicate  the  extent  to
which  liberalization  policies  need  to  be accompanied  by  changes  in
taxation  and  government  spending.
Section  2  illustrates  the  budgetary  impact  of financial  repres-
sion.  The  exposition  highlights  the  linkage  with  international  capi-
tal  controls,  and  characterizes  the  choice  between  these  distortions
and  other  types  of taxes  available  to  governments.  Section  3  de-
scribes  the  methodology  of  the  empirical  analysis,  and  our  data
set,  which  comprises  24 countries,  over  the  1972-1987  period.  Sec-
tion  4 presents  the  results  of the  empirical  analysis,  while  Section
5 offers some  concluding  remarks.  The  Appendices  explain  the  cal-
culations  aind report  all  data  sources  used  in  the  empirical  work.
2  Interest-Rate  Distortions  and  Public  Finances
In this  section  we illustrate  the  effects  of "financial  repression"  on
govcrnment  budgets,  and  ask  whether  or not it could  arise  from  op-
timizing  behavior  by  governments.  "Financial  repression"  is not  a
precise  concept  since  the  controls  on  financial  markets  imposed  by
developing  countries'  governments  are  typically  the  sum  of price
and  quantity  restrictions.  A  typical  set  of  restrictions  includes
the  prohibition  on  domestic  residents  from  holding  financial  as-
sets  abroad,  coupled  with  compulsory  quotas  of government  bonds
in  financial  intermediaries'  portfolios.  Since  these  quantitative  re-
strictions  are  not  administered  efficiently  (both  prices  and  quanti-
ties  are  typically  fixed),  they  give  rise  to  monopoly  profits  which
do  not  accrue  directly  to  the  government.  Hence  the  conditions
that  make  quantity  restrictions  equivalent  to  price  restrictions  are
likely  not  to  occur  in  most  developing  countries.
To  illustrate  the  effects  of financial  repression  we  set  aside  the
above-mentioned  inefficiencies  of its  administration,  and  therefore
4This  would  require  working  out  the  general-equilibrium  effects  of  liberalization,  including
the  effects  on  the  volume  and  composition  of  tax  revenue.
2assume that  it works like a tax,  whose revenue (at  least in the first
case we look at) is entirely  appropriated  by the government.5 This
approach  is justified  by  the  objective  of emphasizing  the  effects
of financial  repression  on the  government  budget  and  considering
financial repression  as part  of an overall optimal  taxation  problem.
2.1  Financial  Repression  as Optimal  Tax Policyj
The  essential  features  of financial  repression  are  the  distortions
on the  intertemporal  terms  of trade  faced by  private  individuals,
and  the  distortions  in  their  portfolio  allocation  decisions.  These
features  are best  highlighted  in the  standard  two-period  Fisherian
model  of  an  open  economy.  Consider  an  economy  populated  by
identical  consumers-investors  maximizing a utility function  of first-
and second-period  consumption.  Government  spending,  which oc-
curs  in  the  first  period  only,6 also  yields  utility  (but  the  utility
function  is separable  in  consumption  and  government  spending).
In the first period individuals  purchase the  consumption  good, do-
mestic  assets  and  foreign  assets.  In  the  second  period  they  use
the net-of-tax  return  on their  investment,  and  their  second-period
endowment,  to purchase  the consumption  good.  Since the country
is small,  its  own savings and  investments  do not  affect the  world
rate  of interest.  The model  is cast  in real  terms.  The  absence  of
nominal  aggregates like the exchange rate rules out important  non-
neutralities  from  the  interaction  of nominal  interest  rate  ceilings
and  the rate  of currency depreciation  and  inflation-which  will be
discussed  below in section  2.2-but  does not  affect the  generality
of the results.
We consider  first  the  extreme  case where  individuals'  endow-
ment  is fixed and  exogenous, but  the government  has no means of
raising  revenue,  except  through  the  distortions  resulting  from  fi-
nancial repression.  The government  spends only in the first period,
and  finances its  spending  by borrowing  domestically  and  abroad.
Financial  repression  is thus  represented  by a tax  r on the  second-
period  value of foreign assets owned by domestic  resideiits.7
5The  effects  of partly  relaxing  this assumption  are  also  discussed.
6Goverriment  spending  in  both  periods  does  not  change  the  nature  of the  problem  in  any
interesting  way,  but  complicates  the  exposition  slightly.  Hence it  is ruled out.
70nce  again,  the  absence  of  imperfections  and  uncertainty  does  not  induce  differences
3The consumers'  problem  is:
max U(Cl, C2) + v(G)  (1)
C1,C 2
subject  to:
C  =  E1 - (A J  B)  (2)
C2 =  E2 + A(l  + r*)(1 -r)  + B(l  + r),  (3)
for given El,  E2 (endowment  income in  the two periods),  r* (the
world rate  of interest),  r (domestic  interest  rate),  r,  and  G (gov-
ernment  spending).  A represents  holdings  of foreign assets,  while
B are domestic  government  bonds.  Note  that  in a two-period  set-
ting  like  this  there  is  no  important  distinction  between  interest
payments  and principal  repayment,  and to simplify the algebra  we
assume the tax is levied both on interest  and principal.  Since there
is no uncertainty  or transactions  cotAs, investors  require  the  same
after-tax  return  on all available assets,  domestic and foreign (assets
are perfect  substitutes).  Equilibrium  in private  agents'  portfolios
implies:
(1 + r*)(1-Tr)  = 1 + r.  (4)
In other  words,  the  tax  on foreign interest  income  proportionally
lowers the  interest  paid  on domestic  liability.  Equation  (4)  illus-
trates  the  concept  of financial  repression  adopted  in  this  paper.
Financial  repression  is a  distortion  that  drives  the  domestic  rate
of  interest  below  the  world  rate.  This  distortion  affects  public
finances,  and  can be  studied within  an  optimal-tax  framework.
The  problem  (1)-(3)  implies  the  familiar  first-order  condition,
highlighting  the effects of financial repression on the intertemporal
terms of trade  faced by private  agents:
U1(C1, C2) = (1 + r*)(1 - r)U2(Cl, C2)  (5)
where the subscripts  on U indicate  partial  derivatives with  respect
to the first and the second argument  of the U function,  respectively.
The  distortion  apparent  in  equation  (5)  has  been  the  subject  of
much theoretical  and  empirical  work, stressing  the effects of finan-
cial repression  on savings (see, for example,  Fry (1982,  1988) and
between  gross and  net  holdings  of foreign  assets.
4Giovannini  (1985)).  The  recent evidence pointing  to low elasticity
of intertemporal  substitution  in consumption  suggests that  the wel-
fare cost of this  distortion  should not be very high.8 Solution of the
system  (2), (3), (4) and  (5) gives th-  optimal  consumption-savings
decision  of individuals,  for given values of the  tax.  Notice  that,
since domestic  and  foreign investments  are perfectly  substitutable
and yield the same net return,  their  shares in private  portfclios  are
indeterminate.  The solution of the consumption  problem only tells
us how much consumers  will save (total  accumulation  of assets),
but  not  the composition  of the  portfolios.  B  can be  chosen freely
by  the government:  any choice of B  implies a  choice of A by the
private  sector.  The sequence of government  budget  constraints  in
periods  one and  two, respectively,  is:
G  =  B+F  (6)
F(1+r*)+B(1+r)  =  A(1+r')r  (7)
Government  spending  occurs  only  in  the  first  period,  and  is fi-
nanced  by domrestic borrowing  (B)  and foreign borrowing  (F).  In
the  second  period  tax  revenue ha  -'  equal  the  costs of servicing
domestic  and foreign loans  (equatioji  (7)).  The net  cost of foreign
loans equals r*, while the net cost of domestic  loans, from equation
(4), is r#(1  -Tr)  - T. 9 Solving (7) for F,  and substituting it into
(6) we have:
G=(A  + B)T  (8)
Equation  (8) says that  interest-rate  distortions  generate  a revenue
to the government  that  is proportional  to the  total  stock  of assets
held by investors  in the first  period.  The optimal  choice of r can
now be  easily  determined:10 the  government  chooses G to  maxi-
mize (1)  subject  to  the private-sector  budget  constraints  (2) and
(3),  its  own constraint  (8),  and  the  private  sector's  intertemporal
80n  the other  hand,  financial repression might  give rise to much more  serious production
distortions,  associated  with  suboptimal  investment  in domestic  productive  activities.
9 The  second  term  is  the  tax  on  the  principal.  In  this  two  period  model,  however,  the
distinction  between  gross (I  + r)  and net  (r-)  payments  is not  neaningful,  since  capital  is
worthless  in the second  period.
10Since  spending  occurs  in  the  first  period  only,  dynamic  inconsistency  is  ruled  out  by
construction.
5decision rule (5).  The first-order  condition  is:
dv d[(A + B)T] = U2(A + B)(1  + r*),  (9)
it equalizes the marginal  welfare cost of the tax with  the  marginal
welfare gain.11
This model highlights  the basic effects of financial repression  on
the government  and consumers, but  also raises several issues.  First,
financial repression  may not  be enforced by levying an explicit tax
on domestic-residents'  foreign-asset  income.  Developing countries'
governments  restrict  international  capital  flows-thereby  forcing a
differential  between  foreign  and  domestic  interest  rates-but  are
not  in  general  able  to  raise  any  revenue  from  income  produced
by  domestic  residents'  foreign investments, 12 and,  as  we  argued
above,  they  might  not  be  efficiently allocating  the  rents  arising
from any  qvlantitative  restrictions.  These problems  can be  tackled
by assuming  that  financial  repression  and  capital  controls  still  in-
duce a wedge between domestic  and  foreign interest  rates,  but  the
government  is unable  to obtain  revenue from  this  implicit  tax  on
foreign investments'  income:  the quota rents  become a deadweight
loss.'3 The  government's  intertemporal  budget  constraint  (8)  is
thus  transformed:
F + B  = Br
With  a tax rate less than  100 percent  the government  would in this
case want  to  borrow  domestically  at  a  lower rate  to  lc  nd  abroad
(F  < 0), in order  to gain from the  interest-rate  differential.
This  result  leads to  the  second issue-namely,  that  considera-
tion of a more general model, featuring  several alternative  revenue
sources  together  with  financial  repression,  mig'it  modify  the  op-
timal  choice of financial  repression  characteri2;ed  above.  Would
financial  repression  still be chosen by a govermnent  that  followed
optimal  public finance rules?
"The  effects  of the  tax on  savings  disappear  from  the first-order  condition,  by the  envelope
theorem.
12Indeed,  those  very  foreign  investments  are  often  motivated  by  the  desire  to evade  or avoid
domestic  taxes.  See, for  example,  Tanzi  (1983).
1
3Alternatively,  one  could  rely  on  an  explicit  rr  'del  of  international  tax  evasion,  whereby
the  fraction  of revenue  lost  to  foreign  investments  would  be determined  endogenously.
6Such model of an open  economy with  (possibly  many)  produc-
tion technologies  and  (possibls  many)  sources of government  rev-
enue  falls  within  the  model  optimal  taxation  with  international
trade  surveyed,  for  example,  by  Dixit  (1985,  section  3.2).14  In
the presence of constant-returns-to-scale  domestic production  tech-
nologies, and maintaining  the constraint  that  lump-sum  income-
or frst-period  endowment-cannot  be taxed  directly, the standard
production  efficiency  theorem  (Diamond  and  Mirrlees (1971)) ap-
plies:  taxes can drive wedges between  the marginal  rate  of substi-
tution  of any  two commodities  in consumption  and  the  marginal
rate  of transformation,  but  they  should  not  distort  the  marginal
rate  of transformation  away from  the  foreign rate  of transforina-
tion,  which  is represen 1fed  by  the world  relative  price of any  two
commodities.  Specifically,  assume  that  second-period  goods  can
be produced with  domestic technologies that  use labor and capital,
and that  investment  transforms  first-period  goods into productive
capital.  Then  the  marginal  rate  of transformation  of first-period
goods into second-period  goods would equal  the  domestic  rate  of
interest,  and  production  efficiency implies  that  taxes  should  not
drive  a  wedge between  the  latter  and  the  world  interest  rate-
the  foreign marginal  rate  of transformation  of first-period  goods
into second-period  goods.  Under  these  conditions  output  is max-
imized  at  world prices,'5 and  production  efficiency implies  that,
when there  a-re no constraints  on the  choice of taxes  by  the  gov-
ernment,  financial  repression  should be avoided.
This result haz. -wo implications:  first, financial repression  might
be justified  as an efficient means to raise government  revenue only
if there  are constraints  on the types  of taxes that  governments  can
impose.  We discuss  these  constraints  below.  Second,  the  elimi-
nation  of financial  repression  is a justifiable  policy  when the  gov-
ernment  can  indeed  rely on  a  relatively  broad  tax  base,  and  an
efficient system  of imposition.  In other  words, financial  liberaliza-
tion  should  be accompanied  by a fiscal reform.  The revenue from
financial  repression-and  hence the amount  of additional  revenue
14The  intertemporal  nature  of the  model  discussed  here  is  of course  fully  consistent  with
the  Arrow-Debreu  setup  employed  by  Dixit.
1
5Notice,  from  equation  (7),  that  the  relevant  relative  price  of second-period  goods  for  the
government  is the  world  rate  of interest.
7to  be  raised  after  the  liberalization  oi financial  markets-is  esti-
mated  in Section 4.16
We conclude  this  section  with  a  utiscussion of the  factors  that
might  justify  the imposition  of financial  repression  as a means  of
taxation.  The first  is the  presence  of costs in the  administration
of alternative  forms  of taxation.  Gordon  and  Levinsohn  (1989),
for example,  sugge-'  mnodeling  the administrative  costs associated
with  the use of different tax bases as fixed costs:  in order  to set up
the  necessary bureaucracy  to  organize,  administer,  and  monitor  a
given tax,  the government  has `;o  incur an initial  "capital"  expense.
In some countries,  and  for certain  taxes,  this  initial  expense  may
be  very  high.  Income  taxes  or  value-added  taxes,  for  example,
can be  costly  to  raise in  developing  countries.' 7 Using the  mod-
els discussed  above one  could show, trivially,  that  when  the fixed
costs required  to levy other taxes are high enough,  the government
uses only  financial  repression."8 The  second  factor  justifying  the
use of financial repression is the application  of distributional  crite-
ria by the  government.  Redistribution  objectives  can be  achieved
by taxing  the  return  to  capital,  thereby  inducing  the  production
distortions  illustrated  above,  and  transferring  income  away  from
capitalists  to  wage earners.  Finally,  political  considerations  may
favor the less transparent  means of taxation  that  is characteristic
of financial  repression.
2.2  The Financial  Repression  Tax and  the Inflation  Tax
The discussion  in the previous  section has relied on models where
money  has  no role.  In  practice,  however,  financial  repression  is
typically  the  result  of nominal  interest  rate  ceilings that  are well
below the prevailing rate of  . lation  and currency  depreciation.  It
16This  revenue  is irrmplicit, since, as the  discussion  above  has  iUustrated,  it is really  reflected
in  a fall in  budgetary  expenditures,  rather  than  in  an increase  in  revenues.
1
7lndeed,  many  countries  (including  industrial  countries)  estimate  income  taxes  based  on
tangible  wealth  holdings  of the  taxpayers  (see  OECD  (1988)).  A more  accurate,  voluntary
system  of tax  assessment  with  the  backup  of government  audits  might  not  be viable  in  many
poor  countries.  Value-added  taxes  require  an  efficient  system  of border  adjustments,  as well
as  a sophisticated  method  of tax  assessment  based  on  individual  producers'  returns.
1
8Deviations  from  production  efficiency  are  justified  also  when  domestic  production  gives
rise  to  pure  profits,  that  are  not  easily  taxable  by  the  government.  See Giovannini  (1988)  for
an illustration.
8is often argued,  based on this fact,  that  the distortions  in the real
interest  rates  arising frorr, inflation  should be  included  in  thl  def-
inition  of the  inflation  tax.  This  argument  is incorrect,  however,
since the inflation-tax  base is high-powered  money, while financial
repression  affects the  portfolio of non-monetary  assets  held by do-
mestic  residents,  and  the  base  for the financial-repression  tax  we
concentrate  on is government  debt.  Indeed,  the models  discussed
in the  previous  section  show that  the  presence  of inflation  in the
economy is by no means a necessary condition  for governmcnts  to
be able  to extract  revenue  from financial  repression.  Therefore  it
is appropriate  to distinguish  financial repression  from the inflation
tax.
The potential  comple'  entarities  betweun the financial-repression
tax and  the inflation tax  shc  .d, however, be stressed.  Frst  of all,
the  interest  savings  on government  liabilities  can be  obtained  fol-
lowing an inflation policy that-given  nominal interest  rate  ceilings-
implies very low real interest  rates:  we will consider below to what
extent  this  proposition  is borne  out  in the data.  Second,  the pres-
ence of a  limited  array  of financial  instruments  and  negative  real
interest  rates  increases,  other  things  equal,  money  demand-i.  e.
the  inflation  tax  base.19  Another  form of financial  repression,  the
imposition  of reserve requirements,  directly  increases the  inflation
tax base (by increasing  demand  for high powered mor-ey, whenever
required  reserves are in cash). 20
For all of these reasons, it is to be expected  that  the inflatioD tax
is used tog,ether with  financial  repression  in developing  countries.
The complementarity  between these two forms of imposition,  how-
ever, will break down at very high rates of inflation.  In these cases
the real return  on domestic investments  is so heaviiy depressed that
there is flight towards safety-represented  for example by gold, dol-
lars or other  foreign assets-even  if that  entails  substantial  costs,
and  risks of penalties.  These phenomena  have been  documented,
for instance,  by Makinen and Woodward  (1990):  the flight towards
safety dries out  financial markets  and at the same time produces  a
19See  Dornbusch  and  Giovannini  (1988).  In  addition,  it  mnight be  possible  to  produce
examples  where  the  production  distortions  induced  by  the  inflation  tax  are  offset  by  the  low
domestic  real  interest  rates  that  result  from  financial  repression.
201n several  countries,  required  reserves  are  in  terms  of government  securities.
9drop  in money  demand:  financial  repression  and  the  inflation  tax
become substitutes.
3  Data  and  Calculations
The  discussion  above  suggests  that  we can  measure  the  govern-
ment  revenue  from financial  repression  as  the  difference between
the foreign cost of borrowing  and  the domestic  cost  of borrowing.
This  difference is an implicit  tax on domestic  lenders  that  is often
implemented  with  a combination  of international  capital  controls
and  requirements  for domestic financial institutions  (often public)
to  hold government  debt  at less than  market  interest  rates.  Thus
the tax revenue from financial repression  equals the differential  be-
tween the foreign and domestic  cost of borrowing  multiplied  by the
stock  of domestic  government  debt.
This  measure  of government  revenue from  financial  repression
is a conservative one since it relates  to central government  only, ex-
cluding the central bank, state  and local government,  and government-
owned enterprises  whose low interest  payments  on  their  liabilities
also represent  budgetary  savings, although  indirect  ones.  The  do-
mestic  and  foreign  borrowing  costs  are  measured  ex post.  That
is,  the foreign  borrowing  cost  includes  the  dollar  interest  rate  on
external  debt,  the realized change in the value of the domestic  cur-
rency  vzs-a-vis the  dollar,  and  the  change in value of liabilities  in
currencies  other  than  the dollar  (the  "dollar  revaluation  effect"  to
be  described  in  detail  below),  while the  domestic  interest  cost  is
the domestic-currency  interest  rate  on domestic  debt.
The  sample  is composed  of countries  considered  to  be  "devel-
oping"  at  some  point  during  the  period  covered,  which  is  1972
through  1987.  Given the  basic approach  explained  above,  the  se-
lection  criteria  have  been  (i)  the  existence  of significant  foreign
commercial  borrowing  by  the  central  government-indicated  by
a  stock  of commercial  debt  outstanding  and  disbursed  (DOD)  of
about  $ 200 million or more 2 "-and  (ii) the availability  of data  on
the stock and  cost of central government  domestic  debt.  A total  of
2IForeign  commercial  debt  is  defined  as  LIBOR-based  borrowing  in  creditor  categories  2
(financial institutions)  and 6/7  (bonds  floated on international  financial markets) of the World
Bank Debt  Reporting  System.
1038 countries  can be identified by criterion (i).  Criterion  (ii) reduces
the coverage to 24 countries,  and  entails  dropping  primarily  coun-
tries  in Africa and  Latin  America.  In addition,  data  are available
for only part  of the time  period  chosen for any one country.
The Appendices contain  a detailed description  of the data  sources.
The  general  strategy  was to  rely  to  the  maximum  extent  pos-
sible  on  the  same  statistical  sources,  including  the  World  Bank
Debtor  Reporting  System  (DRS)  and  the  IMF  Government  Fi-
nancial  Statistics.
The  same  approach  is  used  to  measure  foreign and  domestic
interest  costs-namely,  the calculation  of an  effective interest  rate.
For the foreign interest  rate,  total  annual  dollar interest  payments
(INTP$)  plus the change in interest  arrears  as reported  to the DRS
by the debtor (INTA$) are taken as a percentage  of average annual
dollar DOD. Arrears  are included because we assume that  countries
face given world rates of interest,  thus including  arrears allows us to
obtain  an estimate  of the  "normal"  cost of borrowing. 22 The DRS
includes  in interest  payments  any  front-end  or  other  fees  where
these  are known:  there  were no rescheduled  interest  payments  on
commercial debt in the years and countries  included in our sample.
Thus  the  nominal  effective dollar interest  rate  (EFFINT$)  is:
EFFINT$(t)  =  [INTP$(t)  +  INTA$(t)]
[(DOD$(t  - 1) + DOD$(t))/2]
where DOD$(t)  indicates dollar debt outstanding  and disbursed  at
the end of year t, and  the average debt outstanding  and disbursed
during the year t is estimated  through  linear interpolation.23 LIBOR-
based  borrowing  of the  central  government  only  is used  to  deter-
mine the foreign cost  except  for Algeria, Greece and India,  where
LIBOR-based  borrowing  of public corporations  is used as a proxy.
For  the  domestic  interest  rate,  annual  local-currency  interest
payments  on central  government  domestic debt  (INTP)  are taken
22To  the  extent  that  actual  arrears  are greater  than reported  arrears,  the  normal  cost  of
foreign borrowing-and  hence the government  revenue reported  below-will  be  understated.
231t  is  possible  to perform a rough check of the  accuracy of our  method  by comparing  the
effective  interest  rate  we  obtain  with  LIBOR.  This  comparison  indicates  that  our  estimates
covary closely  with  LIBOR.  Discrepancies  are likely  to arise because  our estimates,  correctly,
include  any  comnmercial fees  as  part  of  the  cost  of  the  loan,  and  other  reasons  discussed
elsewhere  in this section.
11as a percentage  of the  average  domestic  debt  outstanding.  Typi-
cally, governments do not incur arrears  on their domestic debt;  but,
to  the  extent  that  they  do,  arrears  are  another  form  of financial
repression,  and  are correctly  included  with  out  effective-interest-
rate  method.  Thus  the  nominal  effective  domestic  interest  rate
(EFFINT)  is:
EFFINT(t)  INTP(t) EFFINT(t)  =  [(DOD(t  - 1) + DOD(t))/2]
where DOD(t)  denotes  total-including  holdings of monetary  au-
thorities-domestic  debt  outstanding  and  disbursed  (expressed  in
de.nestic  currency).24 The  taxable  status  of interest  on  internal
government  debt is ignored, since it can differ by debt holder as well
as by debt  instrument.  Furthermore,  it is arguably  more transpar-
ent  to  consider  revenues and  expenditures  separately  (and  there-
fore preferential  treatment  becomes a separate  tax expenditure).
An alternative  to the calculation  of these effective interest  rates
would be to compute  the weighted value of the contractual  interest
rates  on foreign and  domestic  debt,  taking  into  account  the  out-
standing  stock  and  maturity  of each category  as well as  changes
in  the  applicable  interest  rate  over  time.  Much  of the  informa-
tion required  for this  method  is however lacking, especially  on the
domestic  side,  where  in  many  countries  a  breakdown  of  all  the
different  types  of government  bonds,  together  with  their  contrac-
tual  interest  rates,  is simply not available.  Hence the  potential  for
error  of our  method  is much smaller.  Independently  of problems
of data  availability,  our effective rates  can differ from  contractual
rates  for  two reasons.  First,  there  might  be  fluctuations  in  the
timing  of interest  payments  and  in  the  declaration  of foreign ar-
rears.  And second,  there  may  be  differences  between  the  actual
average stock outstanding  and our estimates  based  on the average
of end-of-period  stocks.
In addition  to  the  foreign interest  rate  on  dollar-denominated
debt,  there  are two other  components  to  the  foreign cost  of bor-
rowing.  One  is of course the  average  annual  change  in the  value
24The  holdings  of monetary  authorities  are  included  in  the  calculations  of  the  effective
interest  rate  because  the  treasury  normally  pays  interest  to  the  central  bank  on  interest-
bearing  debt.
12of the  domestic  currency  vis-a-vis the  dollar,  which is used  to  ag-
gregate  country  debt  data.  This  indicates  the change in the local-
currency  value of the  stock  of external  dollar-denominated  debt.
The  other  is the  revaluation  (in dollars)  of external  debt  denom-
inated  in non-dollar  currencies.  It  is captured  by subtracting  net
dollar  disbursements  from the change in dollar DOD (adjusted  for
any  rescheduling)  from  the beginning  to the end  of the year.25
Finally, the government  revenue from financial repression  is cal-
culated  by computing  the  differential  between  foreign borrowing
costs  and  the  domestic  borrowing  cost,  times  the  average  annual
stock  of domestic  debt.  In this  calculation,  an  important  adjust-
ment has been made to central government  domestic  debt,  namely,
the  elimination  of debt  held  by  the  monetary  authorities.  Even
though  the  central  bank  receives  interest  on its  holdings,  the  ac-
quisition of government  debt  is financed by increases in the money
supply,  and  not  borrowing  within  a resource-constrained  environ-
ment.  Thus  it  has  little  to  do  with  the  existence  or  absence  of
financial repression  and  is different from,  rather  than  a substitute
for, foreign  borrowing.  Moreover,  the  interest  rate  paid  on  gov-
ernment  debt  held by the  central  bank  is not  really  a cost,  since
interest  receipts  contribute  to central  bank  profits  which are  typi-
cally returned  to the  budget.
Aside from restricting  the government  sector to  central govern-
ment,  there  are three  other  reasons  why the estimates  of the  rev-
enue from financial repression we report  may be understated.  First,
we disregard the second-order effect of changes in the exchange rate
on foreign interest  payments.  Second, arrears  on foreign debt  may
be  understated.  And  third,  the  stock  of non-interest-bearing  do-
mestic government  debt may be underreported:  its inclusion would
lower the estimate  of the effective interest  rate,  thus raising the im-
plicit tax  on domestic  lenders.  It  would also increase  the estimate
of the financial-repression  tax base,  thus  raising  the revenue from
financial  repression.
25These  items  can  be positive  or negative  but have  typically  added  to  the  foreign cost  of
borrowing.  Both  of these  non-interest  elements  represent accrued  cost,  of which only  part is
amortized  annually.
134  Results
As  we explained  above,  the  measure  of the  revenue  from  finan-
cial repression  used here is the  ex-post  differential  between  foreign
and  domestic  interest  rates,  times  the  stock  of government  debt
held outside  the  central  bank.  This  measure,  however,  cannot  be
used as a formal statistical  test  of the presence or absence of finan-
cial repression.  The reason  is that  surprise  exchange-rate  changes
would significantly affect the relative cost of domestic  debt even in
countries  where  financial  markets  are  relatively  free,  and  capital
controls  are  virtually  absent.  In  a small  sample,  our  estimate  of
revenue from financial repression would be biased towards rejection
of the null hypothesis  (absence  of controls)  whenever devaluations
have occurred-and  have  been  greater  than  anticipated.  In  the
cases where devaluations  have not  occurred,  or have been less than
anticipated,  our measure would be biased in the opposite  direction,
since domestic liabilities  would, in the sample, be more costly than
foreign liabilities:  this is the well-known "peso problem". 26  We re-
frain from carrying  out  formal  statistical  testing  also because  the
time coverage of the  countries  in the sample  varies widely. In any
case, however, the data  we report  do represent  budgetary  savings
to central  governments-whether  voluntary  or involuntary.
Tables 1 and 2 contain  the estimates  of the annual revenue from
financial repression  for each of the countries,  in the years for which
data  are  -vailable. We measure  this  revenue  both  as a fraction  of
GDP (table  1) and as a fraction  of total  central government  revenue
(table  2).  The  tables  also report  the  average  revenue by country
across years.  The  last  column  on the  right  of table  1 reports  the
average financial repression  tax rate,  that  is the difference between
foreign and domestic  interest  costs.
Table  1 shows that  revenue from financial repression has ranged
from  0 in  Indonesia,  where  domestic  government  debt  is held ex-
clusively by the central  bank,  to 6 percent  of GDP  in Mexico and
Zimbabwe, where the effect of unanticipated  exchange-rate  changes
probably  plays  an  important  role,  due  to  the  short  sample.  In
seven countries  it exceeds 2 percent  of GDP, and  in five countries
26See  Lizondo  (1983).
14it exceeds 3 percent.  The significant cross-country  variation  is ac-
companied  by substantial  time-variation.
Table 2 shows that  financial  repression  has been  as high  as 40
percent  of government  revenue in Mexico (where  in 1987 it was as
high as 83 percent  of GDP, see below for discussion),  and  about  20
percent  in India, Pakistan,  Portugal,  Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe.  In
general,  tables  1 and  2 suggest that  in many  countries  a financial
liberalization  will generate  a  substantial  budgetary  problem,  and
should be accompanied  by a fiscal reform aimed at substituting  for
the revenue  loss.27
The  possible  effects  of financial  liberalization  can  be  gauged
from  table  3, reporting  the  breakdown  of ownership  of domestic
government  debt.  For  completeness,  the  table  includes  central-
bank  holdings,  even though  those  are  not  included  in  the  calcu-
lation  of the financial-repression  tax  base.  The  second  column  in
the  table  includes  holdings  of deposit  money  banks  only-a  sub-
set  of domestic  financial  intermediaries.  The  table  shows  that,
for  the  years  where  we have  data,  on  average  24  percent  of  to-
tal  government  domestic  debt,  and  37 percent  of domestic  debt
in  the hands  of the public,  is held by deposit  money banks.  The
holdings  of other  financial institutions  are included  in the  column
labelled  "other",  but  unfortunately  could  not  be  singled out  for
lack cf  data.  Financial  intermediaries,  and  among  them  deposit
money  banks,  typically  offset artificially  low rates  on their  assets
by paying low rates on their liabilities-savings  and  time  deposits:
this  is an example of the translation  of the financial repression  tax.
In these  cases the effect of a financial liberalization  is an  increase
in  the  cost  of liabilities  to  financial  intermediaries,  since domes-
tic  residents  can access higher-yielding  portfolio  investments  else-
where.  In  absence of an  increase  in interest  rates  on government
securities,  financial intermediaries  would thus risk bankruptcy,  and
would possibly  require public  bailout.  Hence the  likely budgetary
impact  of financial liberalization  is either  the cost of the bailout  of
these  intermediaries,  or an increased  cost of debt  servicing,  which
would occur if government  securities  were mostly  short-term.
27 0n  this  topic,  see,  for example,  Thirsk  (1990).  This  conclusion  is based  on  the assumption
that  the  world  rate  of interest  paid  by  the  government  on  its  foreign  debt  is exogenous,  i.e.
the  small  country  assumption.
15Tables 4 and  5 report  the two components  of the revenue from
financial  repression:  interest-rate  differentials  and  changes  in ex-
change rates  (inclusive  of the  "dollar  revaluation  effect").  In the
majority  of countries  the  time-variation  of exchange-rate  changes
account  for most  of time-variation  of the  gains from  financial  re-
pression.  This  is confirmed  by the decomposition  of the  variance
(over the sample for each country)  of financial repression:  on aver-
age the variance of the exchange-rate  component  is three  times the
variance of the interest-differential  component.28 We do not report
separate  data  on the  dollar revaluation  effect since it is small  (less
than  one-half  of one percent)  for most  years  and  for all countries
if averaged  over time.  This is due  to the fact  that  in the majority
of countries  almost  all foreign commercial  debt  is denominated  in
dollars.29
The  evidence  in tables  4 and  5 is suggestive  of the  way finan-
cial repression  works  in  practice.  Domestic  interest-rate  ceilings
are maintained  with  high rates  of currency  depreciation  and  high
domestic  inflation.  With  free capital  markets,  this  source  of rev-
enue would be limited,  since expectations  of exchange-rate  changes
would be reflected in the differential between domestic  and  foreign
interest  rates.  Table  6 reports  information  about  the  geographic
and time distribution  of financial-repression  tax revenue.  The data
in the table should be interpreted  cautiously, since the non-uniform
time  coverage of the countries  in the sample  makes regional  aver-
ages contain  different  time periods  in different regions,  while time-
averages  contain  different  countries  in  different  subperiods.  Yet
table  6 seems  to  reveal  a  number  of suggestive  facts,  worthy  of
closer inspection  in  future  research:  financial  repression  appears
to be more relevant in African countries  (including  North  Africa),
and least  important  in Asian  countries.  It  is also much more evi-
dent in the recent  years (1979-1987),  than  in the early  part  of the
sample.  This  last  phenomenon  is associated  with  the  growth  of
fiscal imbalances  among LDCs in the  1980s.
In section 2.1 we showed that  financial repression  would not  be
used  by  an  optimizing  government,  if all the  assumptions  of the
28The  results  of this  variance  decomposition  are  available  from us  on  request.
29  We  verified  this by  looking  at  data  on  the currency  of denomination  of external  debt  from
the  World  Bank  DRS.  Detailed  data  on the  dollar  revaluation  effect  are  available  on  request.
16Diamond-Mirrlees  optimal  tax problem are satisfied, and in partic-
ular if a government  does not face costs in the use of certain  types of
taxes.  We also argued that  in poorer  countries these costs are likely
to  be  more  significant;  therefore  taxes  that  distort  production-
like financial  repression-might  be used more frequently.  To verify
this  proposition  we compute  the correlation  between per-capita  in-
come and  the  revenue from financial  repression.30 Figure  1 shows
cross-country  correlation  coefficients,  computed  for each  year  in
the sample-period.  Once  again, note  that  since the  time-coverage
of each  country  differs,  the  number  of elements  in each  year  dif-
fers  as  well:  for each  year,  the  figure reports  the  sample  size in
parenthesis.
The correlation  between per capita income and financial-repression
tax revenue as a fraction  of GDP tends  to be positive, even though
it is very  low for all years,  except  1985.  The  correlation  between
per-capita  income  and  financial-repression  tax  revenue  as a  per-
centage of total  government  revenue is instead  often negative.  The
latter  is closer to  our  predictions,  while the  former  is not.  The
difference between  the  two histograms  is in part  explained  by the
positive correlation  between total  tax revenue as a fraction  of GDP
and  per-capita  income:  with  higher  per-capita  income  total  tax
revenue  ncreases  more  than  the  revenue  from  financial  repres-
sion,  and  therefore  the  financial-repression  tax  revenue  accounts
for smaller fractions  of total  tax revenue.
To highlight  the  contribution  of each country  in  Figures  2 and
3 we report  scatter  plots  of time  averages-which  should  also  to
some extent  dampen  the effects of exchange-rate  surprises.  Figure
2 shows a positive  but  very small covariation  of the  revenue from
financial  repression  as a fraction  of GDP  and  per-capita  income,
while  figure  3  show  a  negative  covariation  between  the  revenue
from  financial  repression  as  a  fraction  of total  revenue  and  per-
capita  GDP.  On the whole, Figures  1 to 3 do not  seem to indicate
the existence  of a  clearly-noticeable  inverse relation  between  per-
capita  income  and  financial-repression,  even though  we find  that
the  latter  decreases  somewhat  in  importance  as  a  source  of  tax
revenue  in  richer  countries.  We would  expect  results  that  more
30Per capita  income  is per-capita  GDP  expressed  in  US dollars.
17strongly  support  our  predictions  if the  sample  included  industrial
countries.
The relationship  between inflation  and  financial  repression  was
discussed  in section  2.2.  Here  we report  the  correlations  between
the financial-repression  tax revenue and both  inflation and changes
in nominal  exchange  rates.  As shown  in figures 4 and  5, the  cor-
relations  are  all positive,  except  for the  years  1984 and  1985.  A
comparison  of the  two figures seems  to  suggest  that  the  revenue
from  financial  repression  is however  more  highly  correlated  with
the  change  in  the  nominal  exchange  rate  than  with  the  rate  of
inflation. 3 1
Figures  6  and  7 report  the  scatter  plot  of  the  time-averages.
The figures  show the presence  of two outliers:  Mexico and  Brazil.
In  the former  country  both  inflation  and  the revenue  from  finan-
cial  repression  are  very  high;  in  the  latter  country  the  inflation
rate  is very high but  the revenue from financial repression  is lower
than  in the  rest  of the sample.  The  Mexico data  cover the period
1984-1987, during  which there were extensive trade  and foreign ex-
change controls.  The very high government  revenues from financial
repression  in the last two years of this period follow the  drop in oil
prices in 1985. They are due to the substantial  and largely unantic-
ipated  inflation  and  exchange-rate  devaluation.32 The  Brazil  data
cover the  period  1983-1987.  They  reflect  the  flexible  exchange
rate  regime, as well as the  sophistication  of the country's  financial
markets.33 The combination  of '  gh inflation  and  low financial  re-
pression in Brazil  is suggestive of the difficulties of rasing  revenue
from financial  repression  in countries  where markets  are relatively
free and surprise exchange-rate  devaluations  are not possible.  This
31An issue  we have not  addressed  directly  is  the correlation  of financial repression  wi  h the
real exchange  rate,  that  is  the  nominal  exchange  rate  corrected  for  the  relative  price  levels.
The  reason  for  this  omission  is that,  in  the  absence  of short  run  "surprises"  in  exchange-rate
changes,  we have  no strong  theoretical  priors  about  what  this correlation  should  be.  Of course,
when  exchange-rate  surprises  are  taken  into  account,  we  expect  this  correlation  to  be  high
due  to  short-run  price  stickiness,  and  the fact  that  financial  repression  is correleted  with  the
nominal  exchange  rate.  Indeed,  we  have  found  that  the  year-to-year  variation  of  financial
repression  is  relatively  highly  correlated  with  the change  in  the  real  exchange  rate.  When  we
compute  time-averages,  we find  that  the  cross-country  correlation  of financial  repression  and
the  change  in  the  real  exchange  rate  is about  30 percent-for  both  measures  of revenue.
32See Easterly  (1989).  He finds  that  the  total  tax  on financial  intermediation  was 2 percent
of GDP  in  1985,  an6i 9 percent  in  1986.
33See,  for example,  Ghosh  (1990)  for a description  of financial  markets  in  Brazil.
18high  elasticity  of the financial repression  tax  base  to the  tax  rate,
would manifest  itself at very high rates  of inflation-as  we argued
above in section  2.2.
Finally,  to illustrate  the extent  to which domestic  interest  rates
do not  reflect subsequent  exchange-rate  changes we plot  in  figure
10 the cross-country  correlations  between interest-rate  differentials
(dollar  interest  rates  on foreign debt  minus domestic  currency  in-
terest  rate  on domestic  debt)  and  exchange  rate  changes (percent
increase  in the  price of the dollar  in domestic  currency  terms).  If
domestic  interest  rates  were allowed to reflect expectations  about
exchange  changes, and these expectations  were on average correct,
this correlation  should be negative, and close to -1.  We find instead
that  over many years  in  the  1970s the  correlation  is positive  and
rather  large.  It  turns  negative, and  close to -1 in thc 1980s, in part
because  of the  inclusion of an  outlier,  Brazil,  whose experience  is
discussed above.
5  Summary  and  Concluding  Remarks
rhis  paper  has  presented  an  exploratory  analysis  of the  theoreti-
,al underpinnings  and  the empirical  relevance of the  phenomenon
of financial  repression  from a public-finance  perspective.  We have
shown  that  financial  repression  should  not  be  resorted  to  when
countries  face no constraints  in the  use of different forms  of taxa-
tion.  However, whenever there  are  costs of administering  certain
types  of taxes  or  whenever  income  distribution  becomes  an  ob-
jective  of the  government,  an  implicit  tax  on  domestic  financial
markets  may be part  of an optimal  taxation  program.  We also ar-
gued that  there  should be complementarities  between the financial-
repression  tax and  the inflation  tax.  Throughout,  we relied on ex-
plicit open economy  assumptions,  and  stressed  the interactions  of
capital  controls and  financial repression.
Our empirical  investigation  suggests  that  the  revenue  from  fi-
nancial repression  can be  quite  substantial:  the unweighted  cross-
country  average  is about  2 percent  of GDP  and  9 percent  of to-
tal  government  revenue  (excluding  the  revenue from  financial  re-
pression),  but  varies significantly across countries.  Hence, reforms
19aimed  at liberalizing  financial  markets  and  removing capital  con-
trols  should first  identify  the size of the  government  revenue from
financial  repression,  and provide for the  revenue shortfall  the  gov-
ernment  experiences as a result  of the  liberalization.
We also uncovered  convincing evidence of some complementar-
ity between inflation  and financial  repression:  in general  countries
with higher rates of inflation,  and therefore  higher rates of currency
depreciation,  tend to raise more revenue from financial repression.
This  occurs  because  the  relative  costs  of domestic  borrowing  is
influenced  by  the  rate  of depreciation  of the  domestic  currency,
since domestic  nominal  interest  rates  are normally  fixed adminis-
tratively.
This  prima-facie  evidence  on  the  quantitative  importance  of
financial  repression  opens  in our  view important  questions  for re-
search  and  policymaking.  First,  it would be  useful to  carry  out  a
theoretical  assessment  and empirical estimation-based  on general-
equilibrium  analysis-of  the  production  distortions  generated  by
financial repression.  Second, from  the policymakers'  viewpoint,  it
is important  to identify,  at the  country  level, those  reforms of tax
systems  that  would replace financial  repression  with more efficient
means of raising revenue.
20Appendix  A  Data  Sources
ifn order  to  achieve maximum  cross-country  comparability,  we try
to use the same statistical  sources.  Calculations  of the foreign cost
of borrowing  are based  on external  debt  statistics  from the  World
Bank  Debtor  Reporting  System.  To the extent  possible,  stocks  of
central  government  domestic  debt  and  holdings of these  stocks by
the monetary  authorities  and  deposit money banks  are taken  from
the  IMF  Government  Financial  Statistics  (GFS).  This  is possible
for 8 countries,  and  the  preferred  concept  of consolidated  central
government  is used  for  all  these  countries  except  Jordan,  where
only budgetary  data  are available.  GFS data  on total  interest  pay-
ments are broken down into their foreign and domestic  components
by locating  a country-specific  source with  this  information.  Total
interest  payments  from  this  country  source  approximate,  but  do
not  always equal,  the GFS  total.
For another  7 countries,  country-specific  data  on the domestic
debt  stock  are quite  close  within  ten percent-to  GFS  data,  and
the domestic  interest  payments  used  are consistent  with  this  debt
stock.  For  another  6 countries,  domestic  debt  stocks  are signifi-
cantly  different-more  than  ten  percent-from  GFS data  (higher
for 3 and lower for 3) but  are the only central government  domestic
debt  figures for which associated  interest  payments  could be iden-
tified.  Finally,  GFS  has no data  on domestic  debt  for 3 countries
(Algeria,  Mexico and  Portugal)  and  therefore  direct  comparison
with  GFS standard  definitions  is not  possible.  Again,  budgetary
data  are occasionally  used  when consolidated  accounts,  which  in-
clude social security  and  extra-budgetary  funds,  are not  available.
Country-specific sources for these data  and central government  rev-
enues  are shown  in  Appendix  B. Data  on  GDP,  population,  and
the GDP  deflator are also taken from GFS, and  exchange rates  are
from  the IMF  International  Financial Statistics.
Below we describe in detail the calculations  performed  to obtain
the government  revenue from financial  repression,  and  the  sources
used for each country.  For each country  we prepared  a worksheet,
whose columns  contain  the years  for which  data  is available,  and
rows contain  the items  reported  below.
21LINE #  ENTRIES  SOURCE OR FORMULA
1. Total  domestic  debt outstand-  IMF  Government  Finance
ing and  disbursed  Statistics  (GFS)  and  Country
Source A
2. Domestic  Debt held by Mone-  GFS and  Country  Source B
tary  Authorities
3. Interest  payments  on #  1:
a) Total  from GFS  a) GFS
b) Domestic  b) Country  Source  C
c) Foreign  c) Country  Source  C
d) Total  of b) and  c)  d) #  3a and  #  3b
4. Effective  Domestic  Interest  #  3a  divided  by  (#1(t)  +
Rate  #1(t-  1))/2
5. Total  Cen-  World  Bank  Debtor  Report-
tral  Government  Libor-based  ing System  (DRS)  Table  2
External  Debt  (US$  ,000)  Creditor  types  2,6, & 7
6. Marginal  Foreign  Central  World Bank  DRS
Government  Interest  Rate  on
#5
7. Average  Effective  For-  Interest  payments  from DRS
eign  Central  Government  In-  Table  2 plus change in
terest  Rate  reported  interest  arrears
(from  DRS intermediate
spreadsheets)  divided  by  an-
nual average of #  5
8. Exchange  Rate,  Average An-  International  Financial Statis-
nual  LC/$  tics (IFS)
9.  Percent  change in #  8  (#8(t)  - #8(t  - 1))/#8(t  - 1)
2210. Dollar Revaluation  Cost  World Bank DRS Table 2, col-
umn  9 (adjusted  to  eliminate
the effects of reschedulings)  at
t  divided  by  column  #  1 at
t - 1
11. Foreign Cost  of Borrowing  #7  + #9  + #10
12. Cost  Difference  #11  - #4
13. Revenue  from  Financial  Re-  #12  *  [(#1(t)  - #2(t))  +
pression  (#1(t  - 1)-  #2(t  -1))/2
14. GDP  IFS
15. Total  Central  Government  GFS  .nd  Country  Source D
Revenue
16. Revenue  as percent  of GDP  #13/#14
17. Revenue  as  percent  of  total  #13/#15
tax  revenue
18. GDP  Deflator  IFS
19. Inflation  Percent  change in  #  18.
20. Per  Capita  Income  IFS
23Appendix  B  Country  Sources
Country  Source A
Algeria  Data  base from World Bank  country  desk.
Brazil  Data  base from World Bank  country  desk.
Colombia  Informe  Financiero  Vagencia de  1984, published
by the  Controlor  General;  GFS.
Costa  Rica  1971-1981,  trom  Situation  Fiscal  de  Costa  Rica
January  1983; published  by the  Departmento  de
Estudios  Economicos;  1981-1984  from  GFS  and
the  Boletin  Estadistico  published  by Banco  Cen-
tral  de Costa  Rica.
Greece  Economic  Research  Division,  Central  Bank  of
Greece.
India  The  Reserve  Bank  of India,  Occasional  Papers
June  1987, pp.  63-64 (figure referred to as GAIL)
Jamaica  Statistical  Digest,  Bank  of Jamaica  Research  &
Dev't  Division, various years.
Jordan  1985-1987 from  the  Monthly  Statistical  Bulletin
published  by  the  Central  Bank  of Jordan,  Jan-
uary  1989.
Malaysia  Ministry  of Finance Economic Report,  1981-82 &
1986-87; GFS.
Mexico  Report  to  Congress,  1989 and  data  from  World
Bank  country  desk.
Panama  Informe  del  Controlor  General  de  la  Republica,
October  1983 and  March  1988.
Papua  New  Quarterly  Economic  Bulletin,  Bank  of  Papua
Guinea  New Guinea, September  1988.
24Philippines  Budget  Receipts  & Expenditures  Pursuant  to the
Program of Government  as Approved  by the Pres-
ident,  various  years.
Portugal  Banco de Portugal,  Report  of the Board  of Direc-
tors for the Year, various  years.
Thailand  'Thailand  Statistical  Yearbook,  1981,  1984  &
1987-88; published by the National  Statistical  Of-
fice.
Tunisia  World Bank country  data.
Turkey  Quarterly  report  submitted  by the  World  Bank
Resident  Representative  and  country  desk  data
base for consolidated  central  government.
Zimbabwe  Ministry  of Finance,  Financial  Statements,  annu-
alized.
Country  Source B
Algeria  Same as Source A
Brazil  Same as Source A
Costa  Rica  Same as Source A, Table  entitled  Credito  Bruto.
Greece  Same as Source A.
India  Reserve  Bank  of  India,  Report  on  Currency  &
Finance;  1986-87 Edition,  Statements  90 &  86;
1978-79 Edition,  Statements  79 & 83
Mexico  Same as Source A.
Papua  New  Same as Source A.
Guinea
Portugal  Same as Source A.
Tunisia  Same as Source A.
Turkey  Same as Source A.
25Zimbabwe  Same as Source A.
Country  Source  C
Algeria  Same as Source  A less foreign interest  payments
per  DRS.
Brazil  Same as Source A.
Colombia  Same as Source A.
Costa  Rica  Same as Source A.
Greece  Same as Source A.
India  Same as Source A, pp.  72-73.
Indonesia  Same as Source A.
Jamaica  Financial  Statements  &  Revenue  Estimates  as
Presented  to  the House of Representatives,  com-
piled  by  the  Ministry  of Finance  and  Planning
(various  years).
Jordan  Central  Bank of Jordan,  Monthly  Statistical  Bul-
lettin.
Korea  Korea  Statistical  Yearbook,  1987, p.  505,  pub-
lished by the  National  Bureau  of Statistics.
Malaysia  Ministry  of Finance  Economic  Report,  various is-
sues.
Mexico  Same as Source A.
Morocco  Unpublished  data  from  the  Morocco  Ministry  of
Finance,  per  World Bank  country  desk.
Pakistan  Budget  in  Brief,  Gov't  of Pakistan,  Finance  Di-
vision,  Islamabad  (various years).
Panama  Same as Source A.
26Papua  New  1984-1987 From the  Bank  of Papua  New Guinea
Guinea  Economic  Bulletin;  1975-1983 PNG  Ministry  of
Finance Estimates  of Revenue  & Expenditure.
Philippines  Same as Source A.
Portugal  Same as Source A.
Sri Lanka  Country  Economic  Memorandum;  Re-
port  #4482-CE;  entitled  An  Interim  Assessment
of Experience  & Priorities,  May 4, 1983.
Thailand  Same as Source  A.
Tunisia  Same as Source A.
Turkey  Ministry  of  Finance  per  World  Bank  country
desk;  also  unpublished  spreadsheet  provided  by
World Bank  Country  Desk.
Zaire  Data  from  IMF country  desk.
Zimbabwe  Same as Source A.
Country  Source D
Algeria  Same as Source A.
Brazil  IFS for 1983-86; country  desk for 1987.
Mexico  Same as Source A.
Panama  GFS through  1985, IFS  chereafter.
Tunisia  Same as Source A.
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30Table 1: Financial Repression  Tax Revenue
(Percent of GDP)
1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  AVERAGE  IMPLICIT
TAX RATE
Algeria  5.0  0.6  4.5  2.5  0.9  3.0  4.0  7.0  6.3  5.3  5.8  6.1  2.4  6.8  4.30  10.6
Brazil  4.7  -1.0  0.0  -0.8  -0.5  0.48  13.4
Colombia  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.24  22.4
Costa Rica  0.1  0.1  2.6  1.0  0.3  -0.6  1.2  -0.3  -1.6  18.2  5.6  2.2  1.4  2.33  25.1
Greoce  1.2  1.2  0.9  0.2  -0.1  0.5  2.8  5.6  3.5  4.8  3.8  6.3  2.53  16.0
India  -0.1  3.1  3.5  3.3  3.5  3.9  2.86  11.0
Indoneia  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.00  0.0
Jamaica  1.3  1.5  1.38  7.4
Jordan  -0.6  0.5  0.5  2.4  1.4  0.8  1.6  0.7  -1.0  -0.4  0.60  7.2
Korea  0.5  -0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  0.5  0.7  0.8  0.6  0.4  0.6  -0.1  -0.6  0.25  6.0
Malaysia  1.6  -3.5  2.5  -0.9  -1.9  -1.5  1.5  3.1  0.12  0.5
Mexico  0.5  0.8  10.8  11.0  5.77  45.8
Morocco  0.3  -0.6  -0.1  1.1  5.5  2.9  3.7  4.7  3.3  2.31  16.1
Palistan  3.6  2.9  3.23  25.3
Pan ma  0.1  0.3  0.5  1.3  1.3  2.1  0.9  0.9  0.6  0.3  -0.6  0.69  4.4
Papua  New
Guinea  0.4  1.1  0.9  0.7  0.8  -0.5  -0.7  0.40  5.6
Philippines  0.4  0.2  -0.0  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.5  0.6  1.3  1.6  0.3  0.0  0.45  11.9
Portugal  0.5  0.7  0.7  5.6  5.7  4.8  4.8  3.4  -6.3  2.22  15.8
Sri  anka  4.7  2.2  3.3  3.40  14.5
Thailand  -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.5  1.2  0.9  0.2  0.5  1.7  -0.9  0.38  4.3
Tunisia  -0.1  0.3  1.4  3.5  3.5  2.1  2.4  1.3  -0.5  0.9  1.49  13.4
Turkey  6.9  1.8  1.9  1.5  2.3  1.9  0.8  0.6  2.20  55.8
Zaire  0.1  0.2  1.5  0.4  0.2  1.3  0.7  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.46  54.5
Zimbabwe  5.8  4.6  9.1  6.7  7.4  -0.5  5.52  19.5
Country  Average:  1.82  17.7
Note:  The Implicit Tax Rate is the annual average of the difference between the foreign and domestic costs of borrowing by th: government.
. ' ~~~~B.Table 2:  Financial Repression Tax Revenue
(Percent  of Central Government  Revenue)
1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  AVERAGE
Algeria  11.7  1.4  12.1  6.1  2.5  8.1  10.6  16.1  16.9  14.2  14.6  16.2  7.9  21.5  11.42
Brazil  18.2  -4.3  0.0  -3.7  -2.3  1.57
Colombia  1.2  1.7  1.6  2.5  3.5  2.11
Codsa Rica  0.9  0.7  14.2  5.8  1.9  -3.6  6.3  -1.8  -8.8  102.3  32.2  9.8  6.2  12.76
Groce  4.6  4.3  3.0  0.6  -0.4  1.5  9.1  19.2  10.4  12.5  10.6  17.6  7.76
Indi"  -0.9  25.3  27.8  26.6  26.8  28.6  22.38
Indonesia  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.00
Jamaica  4.4  S. 1  4.74
Jordan  -2.3  2.3  2.5  9.7  5.2  2.8  6.2  2.6  -3.6  -1.3  2.40
Lo  Korea  3.2  -0.0  -0.4  -0.4  -0.3  2.8  3.6  4.4  3.0  2.3  3.2  -0.3  -3.4  1.36
Malaysia  7.9  -15.4  11.6  -3.7  -8.1  -6.8  5.8  11.1  0.31
Mexico  3.4  4.6  68.1  82.6  39.65
Morocco  1.2  -2.4  -0.3  4.6  20.7  10.8  14.3  18.4  12.8  8.89
Pakistan  22.7  18.3  20.50
Panama  0.3  1.2  1.8  4.6  4.9  7.5  3.0  3.1  2.0  1.!  -2.1  2.49
Papua New
Guina  2.0  5.4  4.3  3.1  3.7  -2.2  -3.0  1.90
Philipp  2.9  1.6  -0.2  1.2  1.1  1.3  4.4  5.0  11.0  15.0  3.0  0.4  3.88
Portugal  1.9  2.5  2.2  17.0  17.6  13.5  14.2  10.3  -16.9  6.93
Sri Iank  27.1  13.4  17.2  19.24
Thailand  -0.3  0.1  0.1  0.8  3.7  8.1  6.4  1.4  3.2  10.8  -6.0  2.57
Tunsia  -0.3  0.9  4.8  11.9  11.0  6.7  7.0  4.1  -1.4  3.1  4.79
Turkey  31.1  8.0  7.1  7.6  15.3  10.6  4.4  3.1  10.89
Zaire  0.4  0.7  8.5  2.4  1.3  7.2  3.0  1.2  0.2  0.1  2.48
Zimbabwe  22.9  15.8  30.4  21.0  26.3  -1.6  19.13
Country Average:  8.76
SOURCE: Country worksbhcts as described in Appendices A and B.Table 3:  Distribution  of Holdings  of Government Domestic Debt
(Percent)
Time Period (a)  Central Bank  De2osit  Monev Banks  Other
Algeria  1974-87  18.7  56.2  25.1
Brazil  1983-87  46.9  N/A  53.1  (b)
Colombia  1980-84  47.3  N/A  52.7  (b)
Costa Rica  1972-83  19.0  20.1  61.0
Greece  1974-81  21.7  26.2  52.2
India  1980-85  23.1  7.4  69.5
Indonesia  1976-80  100.0  0.0  0.0
Jamaica  1980/1982  60.3  14.1  25.7
Jordan  1978-87  46.3  36.0  17.7
Korea  1975-87  23.9  37.5  38.6
Malaysia  1974-81  4.4  23.2  72.4
Mexico  1984-87  53.7  19.1  27.2
Morocco  1977-85  10.6  56.2  33.2
Pakistan  1982-83  43.5  26.5  29.9
Panama  1977-78  0.0  33.7  66.3
Papua  New Guinea  1981-87  18.3  49.6  32.1
Pbilippines  1975-86  51.6  23.0  25.4
Portugal  1983-86  46.9  10.7  42.4
Sri Lanka  1981-83  32.4  20.2  47.4
Thailand  1976-86  43.0  34.3  22.7
Tunisia  1978-87  0.0  55.0  45.0
Turkey  1980-87  40.3  N/A  59.7  (b)
Zaire  1974-80, 84-86  92.8  6.8  0.4
Zimbabwe  1981-86  16.8  18.4  64.8
Country  Average: (c)  34.6  27.3  38.0
Note: (a) Years  over which  average holdings  are calculated.  Due to data limitations  on holdings
of deposit money  banks, the time period may differ from tables I and 2.
(b) Includes  holdings  of deposit  money  banks
(c) Excludes  Brazil, Colombia,  and Turkey.
SOURCE: Country  workshects  as described in Appendices  A and B.
33Table 4:  Financial Repression  Tax Revenue  due to Interest Rate Differentials
(Percent of GDP)
1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  AVERAGE
Algeria  2.5  2.9  2.3  2.1  1.7  4.4  4.0  3.5  4.4  3.6  4.3  4.8  4.4  3.2  3.44
Brazil  -4.6  -10.0  -14.4  -8.4  -11.4  -9.75
Colombia  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.03
Costa Rica  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.2  0.3  -0.6  1.2  -0.3  -1.6  1.0  1.2  1.3  0.6  0.31
Grooce  1.0  0.3  -0.9  0.0  -0. 1  0.3  0.6  1.2  0.6  0.0  -0.2  -0.3  0.22
India  0.8  1.0  1.2  1.5  0.5  0.1  0.85
Indonesia  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.00
Jamaica  1.1  1.5  1.30
Jordan  0.4  0.8  0.6  1.6  0.8  0.5  1.0  0.3  0.6  0.2  0.67
Korea  0.1  -0.0  -0.1  -0. I  -0.1  -0.3  0.2  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.1  -0.1  -0.2  0.02
Malaysia  1.8  0.5  0.6  0.1  -0.1  0.3  1.6  1.1  0.73
Mexico  -0.9  -2.1  -5.8  -10.5  -4.81
Li  Morocco  0.1  0.2  0.6  1.0  1.7  0.9  0.9  0.6  0.6  0.75
Pakistan  1.2  1.4  1.31
a'amm  0.1  0.3  0.5  1.3  1.3  2.1  0.9  0.9  0.6  0.3  -0.6  0.69
Papus New
Guinna  0.4  0.4  -0.0  0.2  -0.0  -0.3  -0.3  0.07
Philippione  0.1  0.1  -0.0  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.1  -0.0  -0.4  0.07
Portugal  -O.S  -0.1  0.4  1.3  0.6  -0.9  -0.7  -1.2  -2.8  -0.44
Sri Lanka  1.0  0.3  0.1  0.46
Thailand  -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.5  0.7  0.4  0.2  0.2  -0.3  -0.4  0.13
Tunisia  0.2  0.5  1.4  1.2  1.4  0.4  0.7  0.4  0.1  0.1  0.64
Turkey  0.6  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.1  0.0  -0.7  -1.2  -0.04
Zaire  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  0.11
Zimbabwe  3.7  2.9  0.6  -0.4  -1.4  -1.5  0.65
Coutty  Average:  -0.11
SOURCE: Counlry worksbeets as described in appendices A and B.Table 5:  Financial Repression  Tax Revenue  due to changes in the Exchange Rate
(Percent  of GDP)
1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  AVERAGE
Algeria  2.5  -2.3  2.0  -0.1 -1.5  -1.0  -0.1  4.2  2.5  1.8  1.8  0.4  -3.4  1.7  0.59
Brazl  9.3  9.0  14.4  7.6  10.9  10.24
Colombia  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.4  0.21
Costa  Rica  0.0  0.0  2.2  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  17.3  4.4  0.9  0.7  2.02
Greece  0.2  0.8  1.8  0.1  -0.0  0.1  2.3  4.4  2.9  5.0  5.0  4.8  2.28
I-Aia  -0.7  2.3  2.3  1.8  3.4  2.6  1.95
Iadomia  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.00
Janica  0.2  0.0  0.08
Jordan  -0.9  -0.2  -0.1  0.9  0.5  0.3  0.6  0.4  -1.6  -0.6  -0.07
Korea  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.5  0.1  -0.4  0.23
Malaysia  -0.4  -0.2  2.0  -1.1  -1.9  -1.7  -0.2  2.0  -0.18
U'  Mexico  1.4  2.S  16.6  21.4  10.59
Morocco  0.2  -0.8  -0.7  0.1  3.8  2.0  2.7  4.1  2.7  1.57
Pakistan  2.3  1.5  1.92
Pa-ma  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.00
Papua New
Guinea  0.0  0.7  0.9  0.5  0.8  -0.2  -0.5  0.32
Philippin  0.4  0.1  -0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.4  1.2  1.5  0.3  0.4  0.38
Porugl  1.1  0.8  0.3  4.3  5.1  5.7  5.6  4.2  -4.4  2.51
Sri Lnka  3.7  1.9  3.2  2.94
lThiland  0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.5  0.0  P  3  1.9  -0.5  0.25
Tununia  -0.3  -0.2  -0.0  2.3  2.2  1.7  1.7  0.9  -0.7  0.6  0.81
Turkey  6.3  1.6  1.6  1.3  2.2  1.8  1.4  1.6  2.22
Zaire  0.0  0.0  1.3  0.2  -0.0  1.2  0.5  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.36
Zimbabwe  2.2  2.7  8.7  7.3  8.5  1.0  5.06
Country Average:  1.93
SOURCE:  Country worksbeets as described in &ppendices  A and B.Table 6: Average Annual  Savings  by Region  and Time Period
(Percent of GDP)
1972-78  1979-87  1972-87
AFRICA  0.5%  3.0%  3.0%
ASIA  -0.0%  1.4%  1.1%
EMENA  0.7%  2.7%  2.2%
LAC  0.4%  2.2%  1.8%
Average of Total  0.3%  2.1%  1.8%
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